RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL IN SHAREHOLDER

DERIVATIVE SUITS
While the question of a constitutional right to jury trial in a civil
action is infrequently litigated, it presents some of the most evasive
issues, both technical and historical, of our merged federal practice.'
The Supreme Court in Ross v. Bernhard,2 faced with determining the
effect of the merger of law and equity upon the right to jury trial in a

suit which is historically equitable in nature,3 held that legal issues in a
stockholders' derivative suit are triable to a jury. The right to a jury

trial is grounded in the seventh amendment to the Constitution,
adopted in 1791, which guarantees that "in suits at common law...
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved . . ... In the years
immediately subsequent to 1791 it was a relatively simple task to
determine whether the constitutional guaranty extended to civil

actions, but the constant development and sophistication of our legal
system, culminating in the merger of law and equity, has created

problems not contemplated by the drafters of the seventh amendment.
The result has been a considerable amount of confusion regarding the
scope of the seventh amendment, and the stockholder's derivative suit,

apparently unknown in 179 1,5 is a paradigm of this uncertainty.
The suit in Ross was instituted by two shareholders against the

directois of their closed-end investment company and the cor1.See generally James, Trial by Jury and the New Federal Rules of Procedure, 45 YALE L.J.
1022 (1936); James, Right to Jury Trial in CivilAct ions, 72 YALE L.J. 655 (1963) [hereinafter
cited as James]. In contrast to the civil area, there has been a great deal of litigation concerning
the right to a jury trial in criminal matters. See, e.g., Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970);
Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970); Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968); Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Fucini v. Illinois, 44 Ill. 2d 305, 255 N.E.2d 380 (1970).
2. 396 U.S. 531 (1970), noted in DerivativeActions and the Seventh Amendment, 18 WASH.
&LEE

L.R. 344 (1970).

3. See notes 46-52 infra and accompanying text.
4. The seventh amendment reads:
"In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of
trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by ajury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any
Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law." U.S. CONST.
amend. VII.
5. Foss v. Horbottle, 67 Eng. Rep. 189,203 (Ch. 1843), apparently was the first reported case
to recognize the derivative suit as it is known today. The United States Supreme Court
acknowledged the suit in 1855. Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331 (1855). Earlier cases
allowed shareholders' suits under a trust theory. See Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige 221,231,233
(N.Y. Ch. 1832); Hichens v. Congreve, 38 Eng. Rep. 917,922 (Ch. 1828).
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poration's brokers. They contended that the brokers controlled the
corporation through an illegally large representation on the board of
directors and used this control to extract excessive fees from the
corporation. The directors were accused of converting corporate
assets, while both they and the brokers were accused of breaches of
fiduciary duty. 7 The shareholders requested that the defendants
account for and pay to the corporation their profits and gains and the
corporation's losses. A jury trial on the corporation's claims was also
demanded. 8 On motion to strike.plaintiffs' jury trial request, the
district court held that a shareholder's right to a jury trial on his
corporation's cause of action was to be judged as if the corporation
were itself the plaintiff. While recognizing that the complaint
employed equitable language in alleging a breach of fiduciary duty
and seeking an accounting, the court found the determinative issue to
be that the corporation was entitled to judgment for money which
should not have been paid out and that such an action was legal in
nature, requiring a jury.' 0 Convinced that the jury trial issue was
sufficiently material to the outcome of the litigation, the district court
permitted an interlocutory appeal." The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit reversed, holding that a derivative action is entirely
equitable in nature and that no jury must try any part of it as a matter
of right.1 2 The court of appeals based its decision on historical
grounds, declaring that the characterization of the derivative suit has
not been altered by either.judicial or procedural developments. 3 Due
to a conflict between courts of appeals' determinations" on this issue,
6. The suit was brought under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a
(1964) which provides in pertinent part:
. . . it is declared that the national public interest and the interest of the investors arc
adversely affected4) when the control of investment companies is unduly concentrated through. . .

inequitable methods of control, or is inequitably distributed, or when investment
companies are managed by irresponsible persons. Id. § 80a-l(b).
7. The directors were also charged with "gross abuse of trust, gross misconduct, willful
misfeasance, bad faith, [and] gross negligence." 396 U.S. at 531-32.
8. Id. at 532.
9. Ross v. Bernhard, 275 F. Supp. 569,570 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).

10. Id. at 570-71.
1I. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1948) provides for interlocutory appeals where the district court
judge believes that a controlling question of law is involved as to which there is substantial
ground for disagreement and the resolution of which would materially advance the litigation.
12. Ross v. Bernhard, 403 F.2d 909, 910-11 (2d Cir. 1968).

13. Id. at 914.
14. See DePinto v. Provident Security Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1963), cert.
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the Supreme Court granted certiorari.' 5 The Court reversed the
decision of the Second Circuit, ruling that the seventh amendment

preserves to the parties in a stockholder's suit the same right to a jury
trial which historically belonged to the corporation and to those
against whom the corporation pressed its legal claims.' 6
The Right to Trial by Jury

Pre-Merger.The mandate of the seventh amendment is founded
upon the division of the English and American legal systems into

separate law and equity jurisdictions, each with different procedures
and remedies. Actions recognized at common law were triable to a

jury, while in equity there was no right to ajury trial. 7 Federal courts
in the United States retained this distinction, declaring that the right

to jury trial existed if the action would have been cognizable at law in
1791,11 the year the seventh amendment was adopted. 9 Well before the

merger of law and equity in 1938, however, it became clear that this
once simple distinction between them could not be retained inviolate.
With the post-1791 creation of many new rights and remedies, such as

the derivative suit, analogies had to be drawn between the new actions
and those prior to 1791 in order- to determine whether the right to a

jury trial existed? ° Thus, the historical test did not prove infallible in
ascertaining the proper existence of a right to jury trial. Even prior to
merger the difficulties arising from the apparent exclusiveness of law

and equity 2' were recognized. There were double actions whenever

denied, 376 U.S. 950 (1964), which held that a right to jury trial exists under circumstances
similar to those in Ross, and with which the court of appeals in Ross disagreed. See notes 58-60
infra and a~companying text.
15. 394 U.S. 917 (1969).
16. 396 U.S. at 532-33.
17. 5 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
38.0211] (2d ed. 1951) [hereinafter cited as MOORE].
Thus, "legal" denotes a claim, action, question, issue, or remedy cognizable in an action at law,
while "equitable" denotes a claim, action, question, issue, or remedy cognizable in an action in
equity.

18. Id.

38.02[2].

19. There is no constitutional right to a non-jury trial in civil cases. Note, The Right to a
Nonjury Trial, 74 HARV. L. REv. 1176 (1961). Furthermore, the right to a jury trial may be
waived by the parties. FED. R. Civ. P. 38(d). While FED. R. Crv. P. 38(a), infra note 30,
preserves the right of jury trial as declared by the seventh amendment, any party desiring that
right must make proper demand. Id. 38(b).
20. 5 MooE
38.1117]; James 655-56. If a new remedy is created which has no common
law counterpart, the legislature has considerable latitude in determining whether the action shall
carry the right tojury trial, Id. at 655.
21. The division between law and equity was not completely clear even in 1791. See James
658. See also 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *434.
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both legal and equitable claims were asserted and frequent dismissals

of suits brought in the wrong forum.2 Under rule 23 of the Equity
Rules of 1912,ss provision was made for courts of equity to try matters
ordinarily determinable at law if they arose, "according to the
principles applicable," rather than sending them to the law side of the
court. The applicable principles included the right of jury trial. 24 The

Law and Equity Act of 1915 2 provided for the amendment of a claim
to conform to the proper practice upon discovery that it had been
brought on the wrong side of the court, as opposed to the old

procedure of merely dismissing the suit under such circumstances.
Merger and After. A more critical examination of the seventh
amendment came with the modern application of the historical test
under the merged civil practice provided for by the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure in 1938. The new rules abolished the procedural

distinctions between law and equity, 2 but the established legal and

equitable remedies remained undisturbed.2? Thus, under the new rules,
no distinction is made between law and equity in the formulation of
issues;2s indeed, all legal and equitable issues pertaining to a single

claim must be presented in one action. 2 While merger has not
impaired any substantial rights to jury trial,30 it has raised
troublesome problems as to when such rights may be asserted.
22. James 665.
23. Rule 23 provided: "If in a suit in equity a matter ordinarily determinable at law arises,
such matter shall be determined in that suit according to the principles applicable, without
sending the case or question to the law side of the Court." Rules of Practice for the Courts of
Equity of the United States 226 U.S. 629,654 (1912).
24. Southern Ry.v.City ofGreenwood,40 F.2d 679 (W.D.S.C. 1928).
25. Act of Mar. 3, 1951, ch. 90, § 274a 38 Stat. 956, amending Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch.
231, § 274,36Stat. 1087.
26. "There shall be one form of action to be known as 'civil action'." FED. R. Civ. P. 2.
27. 5 MOORE
38.02[2]. The seventh amendment is the only obstacle to a complete
procedural union. Thus, the only difference between law and equity under a merged practice is
the matter of the mode of trial. James 663.
28. The former distinction between law and equity does not control nor affect the pleading or
issue formulating stage of the case, except to the extent that a claimant has a choice of legal or
equitable remedies or the cumulative right to legal and equitable remedies and desires so to plead
his case that there will be legal issues presented upon which he can obtain ajury trial. James 2 1.
29. "A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving the
pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its
adjudication of the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction ...FED. R. Civ. P. 13(A).
30. "The right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution or
as given by a statute of the United States shall be preserved to the parties inviolate." FED. R.
Civ. P. 38(a).
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The primary difficulty lies in the fact that many civil actions today
are more complex than any action brought before merger. Normally,
when a modern action has a historical analogue or counterpart, it can
be ascertained as an action at law or in equity, and the mode of trial
may be determined accordingly. Most of the difficult jury trial
problems under the merged practice, therefore, have resulted from the
combination of legal and equitable claims in a single action, since the
Federal Rules encourage the joinder of claims 3 1 and require the
assertion of a counterclaim when it relates to the facts of the original
claim.32 Thus, the unitary civil action created situations which not
only forced courts to deal with legal and equitable issues simultaneously" but which also taxed the ability of the courts to determine
the scope of the seventh amendment. The result has been that merger
has not only restored the right to a jury trial where it once existed but
also where it had previously been denied due to the procedural
differences between legal and equitable actions. Among the situations
in which complexities arise are these: civil actions where the plaintiff
injects both legal and equitable claims; civil actions involving an
equitable defense to a legal claim; and civil actions wherein the
complaint presents equitable issues and a counterclaim presents legal
issues.3 In such cases the guaranty of the seventh amendment must be
separately applied to each element of the modern action which would
have been a separate suit at law or in equity, and a determination
must then be made as to the sequence of trial. Early practice under the
Federal Rules dictated that the order of trial court sequence be left to
the trial court's discretion, with the historical pattern for guidance.35
Two Supreme Court decisions, however, have overruled the authority
for such a proposition and, by doing so, have expanded the scope of
the seventh amendment guaranty.
In Beacon Theaters, Inc. v. Westover,38 the plaintiff sought an
injunction preventing the defendant from instituting an antitrust
action and a declaratory judgment that certain movie distribution
31. "A party asserting a claim of relief as an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or
third-party claim, may join, either as independent or as alternate claims, as many claims,

legal, equitable, or maritime, as he has against an opposing party."
32. Id.

33. See notes 29 and 31 supra and accompanying text.
34. See James 669-85.

35. Id. at 669-73.
36. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).

FED.

R. Civ. P. 18(a).
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contracts were not in violation of the antitrust laws. The defendant
filed an answer and a counterclaim seeking treble damages against the
plaintiff and demanded a jury trial on the factual issues relating to the
question of the violation of the antitrust laws. Both the trial court and
the appellate court looked at the complaint as a whole to determine
the jury question and declared that the complaint was predominantly
equitable t The case thus fits the historical pattern of cases in which A
seeks equitable relief before B institutes an action at law and B
interposes a legal counterclaim. Under such circumstances, the rule
had been that although the legal claim was triable before a jury, the
trial judge had discretion in determining the trial sequence and could
hear the equitable claim first, thus estopping relitigation on all facts
common to both the equitable and legal claims. 38 The Supreme Court
refused to apply this rule, however, and held that because the
counterclaim presented a cause of action cognizable at law the parties
had a right to jury trial on any factual issues common to the prayer
for equitable relief and the legal counterclaim. 3 ' In stating that the
right to jury trial of legal issues could be lost through prior
determination of equitable issues only under "the most imperative
circumstances," 40 the Court effectively eliminated any use of
discretion which removes a legal issue from jury trial.
In Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood,4 the Court, in even more sweeping
language, held that "the constitutional right to trial by jury cannot be
made to depend upon the choice of words used in the pleading. '42 The
plaintiff had attempted to create equitable jurisdiction by asking for
injunctive relief and an accounting, although the claim for relief was
essentially for damages resulting from a breach of contract. The
Court reasoned that even where legal issues could properly be
37. Beacon Theaters v. Westover, 252 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1958).

38. James 683. See American Life Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 300 U.S. 203 (1937).
39. 359 U.S. at 508. The Court could have held that the plaintiff was merely trying to

circumvent the defendant's right to jury trial, that the claim was not cognizable in equity, and
that the trial judge's order to try the common issue to the court was an abuse of discretion.
Instead, it assumed that the equitable claim was valid, allowing for much broader grounds upon

which to base its decision. The rule in American Life Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 300 U.S. 203 (1937),
that an equity court had discretion to enjoin a lawsuit in order to provide a full determination of

a case in a single court was acknowledged by the Court, but it held that a trial judge's order of
trial sequence which denied jury trial of a legal counterclaim through collateral estoppel could be

reversed on the grounds of abuse of discretion. 359 U.S. at 505-06.
40. 359 U.S. at510-11.
41. 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
42. Id. at 477-78.
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characterized as incidentalto43equitable issues, the right to jury trial of
legal issues could not be lost.
Both Beacon Theaters and Dairy Queen demonstrate that the

expansion of adequate legal remedies provided by the Federal Rules
has necessarily affected the scope of equity, since in the federal courts
equity has acted only when legal remedies are inadequate. 4 Because
any legal issue must now be tried to a jury, equity has been deprived
not only of those legal issues which could not previously be tried to a
jury but also of those equitable issues which are so related to the legal
issues that they must simultaneously be tried to the jury. Thus, the
historical test for jury trial may well be anachronistic. While it is
generally agreed that procedural reform was never meant to extend
the right to jury trial, 5 this does not foreclose the possibility that an
extension of the seventh amendment is inextricably linked with the
merger of law and equity.
Development of the DerivativeSuit

The shareholder's derivative suit arose primarily out of corporate
managers' abuse of the concept that a corporation is a legal entity
distinct from its shareholders. The logical conclusion to be drawn
from this "corporate entity" concept was that harm to the
corporation conferred no right of action upon a shareholder. While
courts of law therefore refused to permit stockholders to call
corporate managers to account for harm brought to the corporation,
equity assumed jurisdiction. to enforce rights running to the
corporation. 41 Because the "corporate personality" of the shareholder
was in "ssue rather than his individual personality, the notion
developed that the shareholder was exercising a corporate right in a
secondary or derivative manner." Viewing the shareholder's right as
43. Id. at 473.

44. Professor James questions this premise, pointing to an increasingly large overlap between
law and equity which results from a "borrowing from one jurisdiction by the other." James

658.
45. Id. at 667.
46. Prunty, The Shareholders' DerivativeSuit: Notes On Its Derivation,32 N.Y.U.L. RaV.

980, 981 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Prunty]; see 2 G. HORNSTEIN, CORPORATION LAW AND
PRACTICE § 711 (1959) [hereinafter cited as HORNSTIN]; N. LATrIN, CORPORATIONS ch.
2, § 1 (1959).
47. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541,547-48 (1949); Prunty 980.
48. Prunty 990-91. The first method of providing the individual stockholder with a method
for invoking judicial power to curb managerial abuse was to label the relationship between
director and stockholder as one of trust. See Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige 221, 222 (N.Y. Ch.
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derivative or representative served to integrate "the concept of the
corporation as a separate right-holding entity

. .

with the idea that

the shareholder had a right to judicial protection of his interests when
jeopardized by a defaulting management." 49 As such, derivative suits
are generally regarded as having a dual nature: the shareholder's
equitable right to sue on behalf of the corporation and the merits of
the corporate claim itself.0 Notwithstanding this apparent duality,
the derivative suit has been traditionally viewed as the exclusive
creature of equity with concomitant exclusive jurisdiction in that
system. 51 Since the derivative suit is generally considered a unitary
action, assuming its equitable nature from the right of the shareholder
to sue on the equitable claim, there has heretofore been agreement
that no right to trial by jury exists in such cases on any issues."
The Court'sRationale

Notwithstanding historical evidence to the contrary, the Court in
Ross argued that a right to trial by jury may exist in a derivative suit.
The Court predicated its result on the alleged dual nature of the suit,
reasoning that if the corporate claim were legal, the suit involved legal
claims which should be triable to a jury, notwithstanding the
equitable nature of the shareholder's right to sue.A Relying on the
premise that the seventh amendment preserves the litigants' right to
jury trial in suits in which legal rights are to be ascertained," the
Court found a mandate for jury trial based on the legal nature of the
corporate claim for money damages. Since "law" would not hear a
suit by a shareholder before merger in 1938, it was recognized that
1832). The trust theory, however, was inadequate to extend the shareholders' right to recovery
beyond the management group to application against extracorporate defendants. To meet this

need, the derivative concept was developed. Prunty 994.
49. Prunty 992. In order to bring a derivative suit, a shareholder generally must show that the

corporation has refused to enforce the right being sued upon. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
50. H. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 15 1, at 359 (rev. ed. 1946); 2 HORNSTEIN § 711. See
Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 522-23 (1947); Ashwander v. TVA, 297
U.S. 288 (1936).Seealso 2 HORNSTEIN § 716.
51. 2HORNSTEIN § 711.
52. Id. § 730; N. LATIN, supranote46, at ch.8, § 3;5 MOORE
38.38[4].
53. 396 U.S. at 538-39. See note 50 supraand accompanying text.
54. The right is recognized in:
. . . not merely suits, which the common law recognized among its old and settled

proceedings, but suits in which legal rights were to be ascertained and determined in
contradistinction to those, where equitable rights alone were recognised, and equitable
remedies administered. . . . Parsons v. Bedford 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433,447 (1830).
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such a suit had to be tried to the equity side of the court. However, the
Court in Ross found that the effect of merger was to offer a litigant
the right to ajury trial for any legal claim he had since actions were no
longer brought as actions at law or suits in equity.0 Merger was thus
held to remove "[p]urely procedural impediments" to the
presentation of any issue by any party. 56 Further support for this
proposition was found in Beacon Theaters and Dairy Queen, which
held that where equitable and legal claims are joined in the same
action, there is a right to jury trial on the legal claims which must not
be infringed either by trying the legal issues as incidental to the
equitable ones or by having a court trial of a common issue existing
57
between the claims.
The Court found judicial precedent for its holding in but a single
Ninth Circuit opinion, DePinto v. ProvidentSecurity Life Insurance
Co.,5" a stockholder's derivative suit strikingly similar to Ross on its
facts. In that 1963 decision it was held that a right to trial by jury on
legal issues cannot be denied a litigant on the grounds that the case
reached the court through equity. The reasoning of the DePinto court
paralleled that of the Court in Ross and was premised on the notion
that the merged federal practice expanded the protective ambit of the
seventh amendment. The appeals court stressed "the necessity of
scrutinizing, with utmost care, any seeming curtailment of the right to
a jury trial"59 and concluded that such a curtailment might be present
if trial by jury were not granted. Thus, the seventh amendment was
found to require a jury trial whenever any part of the corporate claim
sued upon involves a legal issue. The basis of the DePinto decision was
that a derivative suit should be treated as a combination rather than a
unitary action, and language in the court's opinion indicates an
implicit reliance on the Beacon Theaters and Dairy Queen rationale."0
55. 396 U.S. at 539; see

FED.

R. Civ. P. 2. While the Court consistently relied on merger as

having made a jury available to try legal issues in a derivative suit, it did recognize the impact of
the Equity Rules and the Law and Equity Act of 1915, reasoning that the same conclusion

"could" have been reached under those provisions. 396 U.S. at 539 n.12. See notes 29-32 supra
and accompanying text. Strangely, however, the Court did not choose to rely on such grounds
for any part of its decision.

56. 396 U.S. at 539.
57. See notes 36-43 supra and accompanying text.
58. 323 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 950 (1964). See generally Note,
Corporations:Procedure: Right to a Jury Trial on Question of Negligence in a Shareholder's
Derivative Action, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 664 (1964); Note, The Right to a Jury Trial in a
Stockholder'sDerivativeAction,74 YALE L.J. 725 (1964).

59. 323 F.2d at 837.
60.

Thus, except under most imperative circumstances, a right to a jury trial on legal
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While DePinto serves as the only precedent in the federal courts
for the Supreme Court's decision, useful analogy was drawn from two
derivative suits for treble damages under the antitrust laws. The first
was a pre-merger case, Fleitmann v. Welsbach Street Lighting Co.,"'

in which Mr. Justice Holmes dismissed a bill brought in equity on the
grounds that the bill did not state a good equitable cause of action
since actions for treble damages must be brought at law. The Ross
Court interpreted this result to mean that a derivative suit for
damages must be triable to a jury. 62 Further support for this
proposition was found in a similar post-merger case, Franchon &
Marco, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures,Inc. 3 In that case, the plaintiff

was allowed to bring a derivative action for treble damages under the
antitrust laws, and the court stated that "[t]he two major issues of
right of the shareholder to sue and of violation of the antitrust laws
causing damage to the corporation can be tried side by side or
otherwise as may be convenient; that one may go to thejury while the
other does not causes no difficulty." 64 The dilemma raised in
Fleitmann was held to have been resolved by the Federal Rules in
Franchon & Marco, and the solution clearly lay in an unarticulated
expansion of the right to jury trial.
Careful not to overstate the effect of the Federal Rules, the three
dissenting justices 5 rejected the Court's conclusion that merger
destroyed "purely procedural impediments" to a jury trial in a
derivative suit, pointing out that such impediments were eliminated,
not in 1938, but in 1912 by Equity Rule 23 which provided that legal
issues arising in equitable cases could be determined according to
legal principles." On the basis of a 1917 Supreme Court decision, the
dissent found that rule 23 did not extend the right to jury trial to a
issues may not now be denied to a federal litigant on the ground that the case reached
court only through equity, or because equitable rights are involved, or because legal
issues are "incidental" to the equitable issues, or because substantive equitable remedies
are sought, orby the device of trying the equitable issues first. Id. at 835-36.
61. 240 U.S. 27 (1916). See also United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244
U.S. 261 (1917). See generally Comment, FederalA ntitrust Law-Stockholders' Remedies for
CorporationInjury Resulting from Antitrust Violations: Derivative Antitrust Suit and
FiduciaryDutyAction, 59 MICH. L. REv. 904 (1961).
62. 396 U.S. at 536.
63. 202 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1953).

64. Id. at 735.
65. The three dissenting judges were Burger, Stewart, and Harlan. Harlan and Stewart
dissented in Beacon Theaters, and both concurred in the Dairy Queen decision.
66. See notes 22-23 supra and accompanying text.
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derivative action . 7 Excepting to the "dual nature" of a derivative suit
as being purely artificial, the minority insisted that the historically
equitable character of the derivative suit has in no way been altered by
the development of the federal practice and that the seventh
amendment cannot be read to enlarge the right to jury trial." Thus,
the minority contended, the basis upon which Fleitmann was
dismissed was not that a derivative suit for damages must be triable to
a jury but that a derivative suit is wholly equitable in nature, and that
therefore there is no right to a jury trial. The concern over possible
abuse of the derivative suit was demonstrated to be paramount; Mr.
Justice Holmes earlier recognized that derivative rather than
corporate actions could be brought in order to deprive the defendant
of his right to jury trial and thus held that derivative actions could not
be brought for treble damages under the antitrust laws." The minority
ignored the resolution of this problem inherent in Franchon& Marco,
devoting its attention to an alleged misapplication of Beacon Theaters
and Dairy Queen. Alluding to the fact that both of the latter suits
involved a combination of historically separable suits, one in law and
one in equity, the minority refused to "force the facts of [Ross] into
the mold of Beacon Theaters and Dairy Queen." 70 The derivative suit,
as a single, unitary, equitable 6ause of action was found not to fit the
historical pre-merger pattern of cases factually similar to Beacon
Theatersand Dairy Queen where the equity court would have disposed
of the equitable claim and would then have either retained jurisdiction
over the suit, despite the availability of legal remedies, or enjoined a
subsequent legal action between the same parties involving the same
controversy. The minority thereby concluded that the historic division
between law and equity survived the earlier Supreme Court cases
untrammelled. The majority's alleged reliance on a distinction
between inherently legal issues and inherently equitable issues was
faulted on the grounds that all issues are factual in nature, "taking
their color from surrounding circumstances."'" The circumstances of
a shareholder's derivative suit were held to prescribe that all issues
67. 396 U.S. at 547. The decision relied on by the dissent was United Copper Sec. Co. v.
Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261 (1917), where the Court determined that an
shareholders' derivative suit must be brought in an equitable forum.

68. 396 U.S. at 543-45.
69. Jd. at 547-48.
70. Id. at 549.
71. Id. at550.SeeJames692;5 MooRe

38.04[1] n.40.
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presented therein are equitable and to proscribe a constitutional right
to have those issues tried to a jury."
Shortcomings of the Ross Rationale

The Court recognized the logical inconsistency which inheres if a
legal corporate claim may be tried to a jury when the corporation
itself sues but not if a shareholder sues. 73 It further implied that there
is no justification for presenting different modes of trial depending on
whether the corporation is willing to sue.74 In its zeal to overcome this
inconsistency, however, the Court failed to devote sufficient scrutiny
to several factors which should be central to its analysis. It did not
even raise the issue of the constitutional right of the defendant to a
jury trial on legal issues presented in a derivative suit, a matter
warranting at least superficial examination, notwithstanding the fact
that theplaintiff shareholder's right to trial by jury is the issue raised
in Ross. It was, after all, the possible infringement of a defendant's
right to a jurytrial in a derivative suit brought under the antitrust
laws which caused Mr. Justice Holmes to dismiss the derivative suit in
75
Fleitmann, a case upon which the Court heavily relied.
A possible explanation for such an .omission lies in the fact that
the Court's reliance on Fleitmann was erroneous, as the minority
pointed out. 7 A careful reading of the Fleitmann opinion clearly
discloses judicial concern, not that legal issues in a derivative suit be
tried to a jury, but that a derivative suit not be brought under the
antitrust laws. In order that the defendant's right to a jury trial on the
matter of damages be at all times preserved, the FleitmannCourt held
that only the corporation itself could bring a treble damage action
under the antitrust laws. 7 Had the Ross Court raised the matter of
preserving the defendant's right to a jury trial, it would have impaired
72. The minority concluded by stating: "The Court's decision today can perhaps be
explained as a reflection of an unarticulated but apparently overpowering bias in favor ofjury
trials in civil actions. It certainly cannot be explained in terms of either the Federal Rules or the
Constitution.' 396 U.S. at 551. While the remark may be unfair, it demonstrates the extent to

which policy considerations might have swayed both the majority and the minority.
73. See id. at 538-39.
74. -[i]t is no longer tenable. . . to deny legal remedies to a corporation, merely because
the corporation's spokesmen are its shareholders rather than its directors.' Id. at 540.

75. See notes 61-62 supra and accompanying text. Under FED. R. Ctv. P. 38(b), any party
may demand ajury trial on any legal issue. The defendant did not do so in Ross, but this does
not diminish the importance of the issue as it relates to Fleitmann.

76. See note 69 supra and accompanying text.
77. 240 U.S. at 29.
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its construction of the Fleitmann opinion; the minority clearly
demonstrated the inadequacy of this aspect of the Court's rationale.
Sufficient attention was not devoted by the Court to the historical
developments presaging merger, notably the promulgation of the
Equity Rules in 1912 and the Law and Equity Act of 1915.78 These
measures were precipitated by a recognition that law and equity were
constantly overlapping and that each had acquired certain
characteristics of the other. 71 Thus, certain "procedural
impediments" to the presentation of legal issues were certainly'
minimized, if not eliminated, prior to merger. The dissenting judges
articulated this fact,80 but the Court chose to disregard it, indicating
instead that the appearance of the Federal Rules in 1938 was the event
which altered the traditional distinction between law and equity."
While merger certainly was the culmination of efforts to facilitate
practice in the federal system, a discussion of the events leading to
merger would have added crucial emphasis to the Court's argument
that any legal issue is now triable before a jury. Such a discussion is
necessary both to demonstrate a logical development in the law and to
reinforce the fact that the erosion of procedural distinctions between
law and equity was a gradual process. The combination of the failure
to recognize developments in the law prior to merger and the almost
exclusive reliance upon the Beacon Theaters-Dairy Queen analogy
creates the impression that the Court, predisposed toward jury trials,
was searching for a suitable justification for a preconceived result.
The dissenters were quick to find fault with this analysis. Certainly
they were correct in their recognition that the derivative suit is wholly
a creature of equity and that, as a historical matter, it cannot
artificially be broken down into separable elements. Thus the
minority reasoned that Beacon Theaters and Dairy Queen would not
apply to the facts of Ross for the simple reason that a derivative suit is
not one in which separate legal and equitable claims are being
asserted. This distinction, however, ignores the same developments
that the majority omitted and demonstrates an unreasonable
delineation between law and equity. While the Court did not examine
78. See notes 21-22 supra and accompanying text.
79. James 658-60. While there was a continuous process of borrowing by one jurisdiction
from the other, there was little equivalent sloughing off of functions. This led to the large overlap

between law and equity. Id. at 659.
80. See notes 65-66 supra and accompanying text.

81. See note55 supra.
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historical evidence sufficiently to justify its result, the minority
refused to recognize that developments in the law, designed to
facilitate federal procedure, have placed the distinction between law
and equity in a different perspective.
Conclusion
While the Court's rationale in Ross may not lend substantial
support to its position, the holding is legally justifiable. The effect of
the Equity Rules, the Law and Equity Act, and the Federal Rules has
not been to extinguish legitimate historical distinctions between law
and equity but, rather, to ensure the right to a jury trial on legal
matters, a right which has existed since 1791 but which has not always
been honored due to the early history of legal and equitable
procedures. Thus, any legal issues arising in a shareholder's derivative
suit are triable to a jury.
The Court's holding raises the question of whether the static
historical test for jury trial is at all viable under the merged practice.
Other tests have been proposed and found inadequate, primarily
because they fall short of the safeguard of the seventh amendment.12 A
primary difficulty in formulating a new test lies in the confusion
involved in defining "legal" and "equitable" matters. It is the
circumstances surrounding a factual matter which convey a legal or
equitable taint; 3 a factual issue may be legal in one set of
circumstances and equitable in another, depending on the relief sought
and the questions of law involved." Thus, if any "test" must still
control the area, it would lie in a definition of the relief sought and the
issues involved, combined with a recognition that merger has enforced
rights which always existed but were formerly denied. In other words,
one must apply the 1791 historical test to a lawsuit as if the Federal
Rules existed in 1791.s 5 Applying this "test" to a shareholder's
82. While both a "basic nature of the issue" test, 5 MooRE
38.16, and a "judicial
discretion" test, James 692, have been proposed as alternatives to the "historical" test, neither
contains vitality since Beacon Theaters and Dairy Queen, which preserve the right to jury trial
for legal issues in all possible situations. Thus, legal issues "incidental" to a suit basically
equitable in nature are protected by the seventh amendment, and a federal judge may not remove
a legal issue from ajury trial as a matter of discretion.
83. James 692; 5 MooRE
38.0411] n.40. See note 7 supra.
84. But the issue of breach of contract should be triable to a jury in a suit for specific
performance, just as the issue of money damages must be tried to a jury in a shareholders'
derivative suit.
85. One may raise the criticism that this test is still historical in nature and that no historical
test is applicable to the united procedure. The only alternative to some form of historical test,
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derivative suit which, at least in part, alleges a breach of contract and
seeks money damages, it is clear that both a legal issue, breach of
contract, and a legal remedy, money damages, are involved. With
courts under the Federal Rules having both legal and equitable
powers, legal issues arising in a shareholder's derivative suit, which
formerly had to be tried to the judge in equity because of purely
procedural impediments, are now triable to ajury.
Judicial rulings justify such an approach; its background lies in
pre-merger developments. Interpretations of Equity Rule 23 prior to
1938 urged the conclusion that the seventh amendment can be so
interpreted as to extend the constitutional right of jury trial beyond
the strict historical pattern. In a 1928 district court decision, Southern
Railway Co. v. City of Greenwood,s the constitutional right to a jury
trial on a legal issue was recognized in a suit brought in equity. The
relief sought was an injunction, but the legal issue of title was
involved, and the court stated that the seventh amendment guarantee
was not to be abridged merely because the suit arose in equityY While
merger should not be used as a mechanism for extending jury trial in a
way that the framers of merger did not contemplate, cases since 1938
strengthen the conclusion that the test for jury trial must recognize
that the law is not static. As interpreted by Beacon Theaters and
Dairy Queen, merger did not make a jury trial available to hear legal
issues in a suit brought in equity but merely facilitated the process of
preserving the constitutional right to a jury trial on such matters, a
right recognized as early as 19.28 and induced by the adoption of the
however, is resort to policy. This is favorable to jury trial and has been suggested as a solution.
C. WRIGHT, LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS § 92, at 407 (2d ed. 1970). The problem with such a
suggestion is that it does not insure the constitutional guaranty, despite the favorable policy
enunciated.
86. 40 F.2d 679 (W.D.S.C. 1928).
87. It is by no means declared, however, in any decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States, . . . that even in an equity case in which the fundamental issue is

dependent upon a question of fact triable to a jury, and in which that right has been
guaranteed by the Constitution of the state and the United States, that equity would be
permitted to determine such [a] question without the jury's decision at law upon such
question first being had. Id. at 682.

We think [Equity Rule 23] means that, where in an equity case a matter triable by jury
arises, the court shall not refuse to try it, and shall not go through the form of sending it
to the law side of the court, but shall determine it according to all the principles
applicable-one of which is the right of trial by jury. Id. at 686, citing Colleton
Merchandile & Mfg. Co. v. Savannah River Lumber Co., 280 F. 358,363 (4th Cir. 1922).
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Equity Rules in 1912 and the Law and Equity Act of 1915. This
pattern has subsequently been reinforced:
It is therefore immaterial that the case at bar contains a stronger basis for
equitable relief than was present in Beacon Theaters. It would make no
difference if the equitable cause clearly outweighed the legal cause so that the
basic issue of the case taken as a whole is equitable. As long as any legal cause
is involved the jury rights it creates control. s

Thus, legal issues which arise when the equitable devices of the class
action, interpleader, and intervenor are utilized are triable to a jury. 9
In its mandate for jury trial of legal issues, the seventh amendment
must be considered in light of present practice. The notion that merger
artificially extends the right to jury trial in derivative suits is
untenable. Similarly, any contention that the right to jury trial was
frozen in 1791 seems unrealistic, and the historical test appears
outmoded.
One must be diligent not to introduce policy arguments into the
issue of the constitutionalright to trial by jury. Ross stands for the
proposition that the Constitution guarantees the right to a jury trial of
the legal issues involved in a derivative suit. Suggestions that the
privilege of jury trial may be legislatively or judicially extended" do
not bear on the matter of constitutionality. Any indication on the part
of the Court that its decision is justified because it remedies the
inconsistency between shareholder and corporate suits is
unwarranted; 9' it cannot be argued that a constitutional right to trial
by jury does not exist because a jury trial is expensive and time
consuming or because jurors are incapable of understanding the
complex issues involved in derivative suits.
While policy considerations may militate against extending the
right to a jury trial,9 2 the seventh amendment demands a jury trial of
88. Thermo-Stitch, Inc. v. Chemi-Cord Processing Corp., 294 F.2d486,491 (5th Cir. 1961).
See also Halladay v. Verschoor, 381 F.2d 100 (8th Cir. 1967); Richland v. Crandall, 259 F.
Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
89. See 396 U.S. at 541 n.15 and cases therein cited.
90. See James 656-57.
91. While the Court's result should not bejustified on policy grounds, this does not mean that
the Court's result is unjustified on policy grounds. If we accept the corporation as the true
plaintiff, unable to sue on its own only because the wrongdoing directors control it, then those
directors, as defendants in the action, should not be allowed to defeat the corporation's right to a
jury trial on a legal claim. Such ajustification is completely in accord with Beacon Theatersand
DairyQueen which establish that a defendant can employ no device to defeat the plaintiff's right
to ajury trial.
92. See 5 MooRe
38.02[1]; James, Trial by Jury and the New Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure,45 YALE L.J. 1022, 1026 (1936).
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legal issues, and it is no defense that a jury could not hear the claims
when the derivative suit was in its nascent stages. In view of the
adoption of the Equity Rules in 1912, the Law and Equity Act of
1915, and of the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
in 1938, legal issues, whether sounding in equity or law, must be tried
to a jury. The seventh amendment question depends on the nature of
the issue to be tried rather than the character of the overall action.'
As long as a derivative suit can be brought under the Federal Rules,
there is a constitutional right to trial by jury of any legal claims
involved-those claims which the corporation, had it sued, would
have presented as legal claims. The constututional right to a jury trial
may not be frustrated on antiquated historical grounds; while Ross
indicates an increased demand on the jury system, undesired by some,
it is certainly a proper application of the seventh amendment to our
federal practice.
93. Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221,223 (1963).

